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END OF MISSION REPORT 
FOR THE 
MARS EXPLORATION ROVER SPIRIT 
 
John L. Callas 
Project Manager 
ABSTRACT 
The Mars Exploration Rover (MER) Spirit landed in Gusev crater on Mars on January 4, 2004, 
for a prime mission designed to last three months (90 sols). After more than six years operating 
on the surface of Mars, the last communication received from Spirit occurred on Sol 2210 
(March 22, 2010). Following the loss of signal, the Mars Exploration Rover Project radiated over 
1400 commands to Mars in an attempt to elicit a response from the rover. Attempts were made 
utilizing Deep Space Network X-Band and UHF relay via both Mars Odyssey and the Mars 
Reconnaissance Orbiter. Search and recovery efforts concluded on July 13, 2011. It is the MER 
project’s assessment that Spirit succumbed to the extreme environmental conditions experienced 
during its fourth winter on Mars. Focusing on the time period from the end of the third Martian 
winter through the fourth winter and end of recovery activities, this report describes possible 
explanations for the loss of the vehicle and the extent of recovery efforts that were performed. It 
offers lessons learned and provides an overall mission summary. 
1 SCIENCE HIGHLIGHTS 
Spirit’s six-year exploration of Mars produced an enormous number and range of scientific 
discoveries and insights [1, 2, 3]. Two discoveries stand out as the most important scientific 
contributions of Spirit: the identification of widespread water-related soil deposits just below the 
surface [4, 5], and identifying of carbonate minerals in the Comanche outcrop [6]. Early in the 
mission, verifying the presence of goethite in the Columbia Hills—a hydrated iron oxide mineral 
that only forms in the presence of liquid water—confirmed the former presence of water at 
Spirit’s landing site, fulfilling one of the prime science objectives of the mission.  
Spirit’s contributions to Mars science did not stop there. Dynamic observations of dust devils, 
clouds, and other atmospheric phenomena added to our understanding of Mars meteorology. In 
addition, the mechanical properties of various soils were investigated, leading to the identification 
of several iron meteorites. Three distinct volcanic regimes were identified and characterized 
(unaltered Hesperian basalt flows in the Gusev Plains, a wide variety of basaltic alteration 
products in the older Columbia Hills, and a more alkalic, volcaniclastic assemblage around 
Home Plate in the Inner Basin). The presence of substantial unaltered olivine in the plains rocks 
provided evidence that the basaltic plains probably have experienced only a cold and arid climate 
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since their formation. In contrast, a diverse suite of rocks with more extensive chemical 
alteration in the West Spur and Husband Hill bedrock indicates that aqueous processes were 
more pervasive during the earliest epochs in this region. Because the Columbia Hills may be 
representative of typical ancient cratered terrain on Mars, this investigation may be applicable to 
geologic study of much of the planet. And the volcaniclastic formations associated with Home 
Plate indicate a completely distinct volcanic style from that responsible for the Columbia Hills. 
 Spirit found widespread multiple occurrences of a layer of sulfur-rich salts (ferric sulfate, 
calcium salts) and hydrated amorphous silica millimeters beneath the surface of the soil. The 
most likely explanations for the presence of these minerals are all processes related to 
mobilization by liquid water or steam. The evidence for such water-related processes in a 
surficial soil layer implies much more recent hydrous activity than that responsible for the 
ancient bedrock of Husband Hill. Analysis of these sulfate salts shows a chemical connection 
with the surrounding rocks in each case, providing additional evidence for an origin related to 
hydrothermal activity or acidic volcanic vapors. Furthermore, a strong 6-micron water band seen 
by Mini-TES in the Tyrone ferric salt deposit indicates that the salts are substantially hydrated. 
This suggests that hydrated sulfates may be an important reservoir for near-surface water at low 
latitudes over much of Mars, and could be responsible for the low-latitude hydrogen observed in 
Mars Odyssey gamma-ray and neutron data.  
The discovery of high-purity opaline silica deposits by Spirit (see Figure 1.1) is particularly 
significant because the hydrothermal conditions that they imply could have led to locally 
habitable conditions. Any process that involves re-precipitation of silica from fluids can also 
provide a mechanism for preserving evidence of microbes; indeed, morphologic microfossils are 
well preserved in some terrestrial siliceous sinter deposits. These types of materials could be 
excellent candidates for future sample return missions. And finally, in Scamander crater, Spirit 
was able to establish that the sulfate-rich sands in which the rover was embedded have a vertical 
gradient in their chemistry (see Figure 1.2). This gradient is consistent with vertical modification 
by downward migration of soluble salts, enriching the upper section in calcium sulfates and 
 
Figure 1.1  Color Pancam image from Sol 1202 of the disturbed soil, named “Gertrude Weise.” 
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silica. Downward migration is likely a consequence of thin films of water associated with solid-
state greenhouse-induced warming of snow packs during periods of high obliquity. 
 
 
Figure 1.2  Color Pancam image from Sol 2163 of the disturbed soil around Spirit at the 
location named “Troy.” 
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 A detailed and 
painstaking joint analysis 
of Mössbauer, APXS, 
and Mini-TES data 
acquired on the 
Comanche outcrop near 
the top of Husband Hill 
(see Figure 1.3) revealed 
the presence of 
significant amounts of 
iron and magnesium 
carbonate minerals in 
these rocks. Previously, 
carbonates were found in 
ALH-84001 and CRISM 
spectra of Nili Fossae, 
but this is the first 
positive identification of 
this important mineral in 
its geologic context. The 
apparently similar chemical compositions of Comanche, ALH 84001, and Nili Fossae carbonates 
suggest a common formation pathway, with multiple lines of evidence pointing to aqueous 
processes under hydrothermal conditions. The Comanche outcrops and their substantial 
carbonate concentration (16 to 34 wt %) imply extensive aqueous activity under near-neutral pH 
conditions that would be conducive to habitable environments on early Mars. The well separated 
Nili Fossae and Gusev crater carbonate locations (~6300 km on a great circle) imply that such 
environments have multiple occurrences in Noachian terrain. The high carbonate concentration 
in the Comanche outcrops is evidence for CO2 greenhouse-type conditions on a wet and warm 
early Mars, and the subsequent sequestering of at least part of that atmosphere in carbonate 
minerals. 
 The discovery of carbonate in Comanche was not confirmed until four years after 
measurements were obtained on the outcrop; indeed, after Spirit had ceased communicating with 
the Earth. The circumstances of this discovery illustrate what may be the most important 
scientific legacy of Spirit: the immense, rich data set left behind for future research. 
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2 ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGES 
The Mars Exploration Rovers, Spirit and Opportunity, are solar-powered surface-roving vehicles 
(see Figure 2.1). Spirit was located at approximately 14° S latitude and Opportunity was located 
at about 2° S latitude. The prime mission for the rovers was 90 sols (Martian days). With no 
consumable on board, mission duration was greatly influenced by the reduction in available 
energy as air-fall dust accumulated on the solar arrays and Mars advanced into the light-limited 
winter season. Although designed with a high likelihood of operation for 90 sols, the long-term 
expectation was that the rovers would lose capability due to excess dust obscuring the solar 
arrays and the reduced winter light generating insufficient energy to survive the cold 
temperatures of the southern hemisphere winter. 
 At the beginning of the mission (Sol 1), for example, Spirit generated more than 900 watt-
hours of energy each sol. By Sol 90 (end of the prime mission), the daily energy production had 
dropped to about 600 watt-hours. In spite of this, operations continued and the mission was 
extended for both rovers. 
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 By the time of the first winter (Sol-A 254), the solar arrays were at only about 70% 
performance for Spirit due to dust obscuring 30% of the arrays, lowering daily energy production 
to about 400 watt-hours. (The project uses a term called dust factor. A dust factor of 1 is a 
perfectly clean solar array, 0 is a completely obscured array, 0.5 means 50% of the solar array is 
covered by dust, etc.) Figure 2.2 shows Spirit’s solar array dust factor over the entire mission. 
Around Sol 420, Spirit experienced her first solar array dust cleaning event. These cleanings 
were likely wind-related (e.g., gusts or dust devils) and effectively blew large amounts of dust 
off the rover’s solar arrays. They occurred unpredictably, but with some seasonality and with 
varying effectiveness. After the first instance of dust removal, energy production increased from 
around 400 watt-hours per sol to over 700 watt-hours, a significant improvement. This episodic 
pattern of array cleaning was a principal contributor to the longevity of both rovers and their 
multiple winter survivals. Cleaning events seemed to preferentially occur when Spirit was 
exposed to the wind at topographically high locations, such as ridge crests and summits. 
 
 
Figure 2.1  Diagram of the Mars Exploration Rover. 
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Figure 2.2  Spirit’s historical dust factor over the entire mission. 
3 LOSS OF MOBILITY 
On Sol 779, after operating for more than two Earth years, the right-front drive wheel actuator on 
Spirit failed. Because of the design of the motor, which utilized magnetic detents and a large-
reduction (1500:1) gearbox, a failed wheel will not freely spin. Spirit’s wheel would remain 
locked, greatly compromising further mobility. Figure 3.1 shows the Sol 781 front Hazard 
Avoidance Camera (Hazcam) image capturing the effects of the failed wheel on the local terrain. 
No explanation has been established for the 
wheel failure, although a motor brush 
failure is one possibility. Also, the actuators 
were operational well past their design life. 
Spirit had driven over 6.5 kilometers at the 
time of the wheel failure, greatly exceeding 
the design requirement of only 1 kilometer 
for the rover mobility system. 
 Although with compromised mobility, 
Spirit was able to conduct a successful 
science and exploration campaign. Indeed, 
the trenching action of the locked wheel 
was largely responsible for the initial 
discovery of opaline silica mentioned 
above. Figure 3.2 shows Spirit’s odometry 
history over the entire mission. The change 
in progress is apparent after the Sol 779 
right-front wheel failure. 
 
Figure 3.1 Sol 781 front Hazcam image. 
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Figure 3.2  Spirit’s odometry history. 
4 WINTER STRATEGIES 
Active measures taken by the operations team also contributed to each rover’s longevity. For 
Spirit, Gusev crater was a dustier environment then Meridiani was for Opportunity, and it was 
also further south, making the winters longer and darker. The operations team positioned Spirit 
each winter with a northerly tilt to enhance the solar insolation on the solar arrays (see Table 
4.1). During her first winter, Spirit was located on the north facing slopes of Husband Hill. Here 
the terrain afforded the rover slopes around 13° to 14° of northerly tilt. With a healthy dust factor 
and favorable terrain, Spirit was able to remain active throughout her first winter. 
 Because of an ever-decreasing dust factor (see Table 2.1), each successive winter became a 
more difficult survival challenge. After the first winter, the rover was required to be stationary  
 
Table 4.1  Summary of Spirit’s winter tilt, dust factor, and daily energy production 
Winter Sol-A N. Tilt Dust Factor Energy Production 
1 254 13.5° 0.71 434 watt-hours 
2 923 11.5° 0.53 278 watt-hours 
3 1591 28.8° 0.35 227 watt-hours 
4 2260 −9.2° <0.50 <133 watt-hours 
(Dust factor and energy production for Winter 4 are not known due to loss of contact.) 
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for the season to conserve energy. More significantly, each subsequent winter necessitated 
positioning the rover, now with limited mobility, on an increasingly northerly tilt. Figure 4.1 
shows a reconstruction of Spirit’s position for each of the four Martian winters. 
 With each passing sol, the available solar array energy was reduced. Figure 4.2 provides the 
historical energy production based on the Martian year (Sub-solar longitude). Southern winter 
occurs at a sub-solar longitude (Ls) of 90°. Year 1 is the period from landing (Sol 1) to the first 
Martian fall. The first winter occurs in Year 2. The fourth winter occurs in Year 5. Note the 
precipitously lower energy production in the approach to the last winter, the result of a lower 
dust factor combined with unfavorable tilt. 
 The Sol 779 wheel failure limited the amount of slope Spirit could climb to achieve 
improved solar insolation to about 12°. Spirit remained stationary on a modest slope (11.5°) 
during her second winter. With net increasing amounts of dust on the arrays, the third winter 
required an even steeper northerly slope for survivability, but the failed wheel would prevent 
Spirit from climbing those steeper slopes. The project was fortunate to have Spirit at Home Plate. 
Here the rover was driven from the top of Home Plate down the side slope. This afforded the 
rover a near 30° northerly tilt. Spirit could not have achieved that slope by driving up. 
  
Winter 1 Winter 2 
  
Winter 3 Winter 4 
Figure 4.1  Spirit’s winter positions. All simulated views are local level, looking due east with 
north off to the left. 
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Figure 4.2  Spirit’s daily energy production for each Martian year. 
5 FOURTH WINTER SCIENCE PLAN 
At the conclusion of the third winter, the project was left with the dilemma of where to position 
Spirit for the fourth winter. Realizing the downward secular trend in solar array dust factor, even 
with occasional dust cleaning events, Spirit would require even steeper slopes than previous 
winters. A detailed survey of the terrain showed no terrain features where the rover could 
achieve the necessary steep slopes. Even if they existed, the rover could not access them by 
driving up, only by driving down from above. 
 The project made the decision to use the time before the next winter to conduct science in 
new terrains to the south. Orbital imagery revealed two features of interest, named Goddard and 
von Braun, about 150 meters away (see Figure 5.1). In addition to new science, these features 
(especially Goddard) presented possible opportunities for the rover to climb their interiors and 
achieve some amount of northerly tilt. Goddard exhibits a ring of light-toned material just inside 
its crater. Reaching that material was considered an important science objective while providing 
an opportunity to achieve a beneficial tilt, although likely wouldn’t be as steep as the north end 
of Home Plate during Winter 3. 
 Several paths were considered to reach the targets to the south. Figure 5.2 shows the results 
of some of the route planning. Initially, Route 1 back onto Home Plate then across to the south 
was the preferred route. It traveled along the best-characterized terrain, at least initially. In 
addition, Route 1 was the shortest path south and had the most downstream options. Route 2 was 
a little longer and required an initial traverse over less characterized terrain. It too had many 
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downstream path options. Route 3 was the longest route and traveled over the least characterized 
terrain. Earlier observations suggested that the terrain along the west side of Home Plate may be 
problematic, with slopes and loose fines. The project prioritized the candidate paths with Route 1 
being the first choice, Route 2 second, and Route 3, if both Routes 1 and 2 proved impassable, as 
the last option. 
 
  
Figure 5.1  Region south of Home Plate Figure 5.2  Candidate routes to the south 
6 ROVER EMBEDDINGS 
After Sol 1800, Spirit began the move along Route 1, the traverse up onto Home Plate. Soon the 
rover began to experience difficulty negotiating terrain with moderate slopes. Figure 6.1 shows 
the Sol 1818 Hazcam images of the embedding that was occurring. After making extensive 
efforts, the project abandoned Route 1 on Sol 1829 and made the decision to pursue Route 2. 
 As a result of the embedding difficulty along Route 1, the project developed and 
implemented the use of hazard avoidance maps. The maps combined terrain slope information 
with science team assessments of soil types and terrain morphology to produce a red-yellow-
green tabular ‘map’ of terrain hazards. This information was used tactically to make decisions 
about the safety of driving routes. Figure 6.2 illustrates the hazard map information. 
Mars Exploration Rover Project  MER Spirit—End of Mission Report 
JPL D-92756 
13 
  
Front Hazcam Rear Hazcam 
Figure 6.1  Sol 1818 Hazcam images showing the embedding of the rover wheels. 
 
 
Figure 6.2  An example of hazard maps implemented after the Sol 1818 embeddings. 
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Front Hazcam Rear Hazcam 
Figure 6.3  Sol 1845 Hazcam images showing the embedding of the rover wheels. 
 Before long, the Route 2 path around to the northeast of Home Plate also proved impassible. 
The rover again experienced wheel embedding while trying to mount modest slopes in loose 
terrain. Figure 6.3 shows the Sol 1845 Hazcam images of wheel embedding. 
 After several attempts to drive around Home Plate to the northeast, the embedding and 
problematic driving forced the project to abandon Route 2. This occurred on Sol 1843, fourteen 
sols after abandoning Route 1 and 
49 sols since the departure from 
the rover’s third winter haven. 
With the unsuccessful attempts 
along Routes 1 and 2, it is 
important to note that precious 
time had now elapsed to get Spirit 
south in time to conduct a science 
campaign in and around Goddard 
and von Braun and then get 
prepared for the coming winter.  
 Exercising their last option, 
the project started guiding the 
rover on the path around the west 
side of Home Plate along Route 
3. Figure 6.4 shows Spirit’s 
traverse around Home Plate just 
prior to her eventual embedding 
along Route 3. 
 
Figure 6.4  Spirit’s traverse around Home Plate by Sol 
1871. 
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 Spirit initially made good 
westward progress along Route 3. 
Figure 6.5 is a Sol 1870 Navcam 
image showing an apparently 
hazard-free traverse path. But on 
Sol 1886, Spirit began to become 
embedded in a location on the west 
side of Home Plate, now called 
“Troy.” Realizing the onset of 
embedding, the project, just as it 
had done for the embedding on 
Routes 1 and 2, made several 
tactical attempts to extricate the 
rover. But after several 
unsuccessful tries, on Sol 1899 a 
stall of the left middle wheel 
occurred. Upon investigation of the 
wheel stall and an assessment of 
the terrain, the project stood down 
from mobility operations. Figure 
6.6 shows the Sol 1899 Hazcam 
images of the embedded rover 
wheels. Figure 6.7 summarizes the 
events leading up to and including 
the embedding at Troy. 
 
Figure 6.5  The Sol 1870 Navcam just prior to embedding 
at Troy. The embedding location is approximately dead-
center of the image. 
  
Sol 1899 Front Hazcam Sol 1899 Rear Hazcam 
Figure 6.6  Sol 1899 Front and Rear Hazcam images following the embedding at Troy. 
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Figure 6.7  Timeline of events leading up to Spirit’s embedding at Troy. 
 
 The proximate cause of the embedding is attributed to the rover breaking through an 
indurated crust into a hidden hazard of unconsolidated fines. The path south to the features 
Goddard and von Braun, which was dictated by the systematic exhaustion of all viable route 
options, led the rover to the unforseen hazard at Troy. This was a contributing cause. The root 
cause was that Spirit had degraded mobility (failed right-front wheel), which generated greater 
terrain shear forces that compromised the terrain’s structural integrity, particularly on slopes. An 
undetected environmental hazard also existed along Spirit’s inevitable route. Details of the 
embedding, including a root cause analysis, can be found in the JPL document “Report on the 
Spirit Embedding at Troy”, dated June 17, 2010. 
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7 ROVER EXTRICATION EFFORT 
Due to the embedding of Spirit at Troy, the project drew upon its experience with Opportunity’s 
embedding at Purgatory. For the Purgatory embedding, the project recreated the embedding with 
the surface system testbed (SSTB) rover in the sandbox at JPL using custom soil simulants. 
Those tests provided guidance on procedures and expectations for the eventual successful 
extrication from Purgatory on Mars. The embedding of Spirit was significantly different, having 
just 5 operating wheels and its location in a more complex terrain environment. The situation 
prompted the MER project to pursue a more varied and ambitious ground-based simulation 
process, illustrated in Figures 7.1 and 7.2. 
  
  
Figure 7.1  Sandbox testing with the MER surface system testbed in simulated Mars conditions. 
 
 After months of ground-based testing and independent project and programmatic reviews, 
extrication of Spirit was attempted on Mars. Table 7.1 summarizes the commanded motion of the 
rover since the commencement of extrication efforts on Sol 2078. On Sol 2092, the right rear 
wheel stalled. Subsequent investigation indicated that the wheel had failed, greatly reducing the 
likelihood of successfully extricating as a four-wheeled rover. However, important progress was 
achieved during the last nine extrication drives from Sol 2144 to 2162. Figure 7.3 shows the 
course plot and progress of those drives. Extrication had to be stopped due to the limited solar 
array energy anticipated during the advancing winter. The project needed to use the remaining 
time to prepare the rover for winter. 
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Figure 7.2  Testing in simulant and aggregate of both the MER surface system testbed (SSTB) 
and the half-weight SSTB-Lite vehicle. 
 
Table 7.1  Spirit’s Extrication Drives 
Sol Odometry [m] 
 Sol Odometry [m] 
 Sol Odometry [m] 
2078 0.02  2120 0.02  2147 0.02 
2088 0  2122 0.05  2150 0.05 
2090 0.02  2126 0.02  2151 0 
2092 0.02  2130 0.02  2152 0.04 
2095 0.01  2132 0.01  2154 0.08 
2099 0.01  2136 0.04  2156 0.01 
2104 0  2138 0.02  2158 0.01 
2109 0  2140 0.02  2161 0.03 
2117 0.02  2143 0.01  2165 0.01 
2118 0.01  2145 0.04  2169 0 
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Figure 7.3  Spirit’s extrication progress from the last nine drive attempts. 
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8 PREPARATIONS FOR THE FOURTH WINTER 
Without adequate time to extricate Spirit before the onset of winter, the project configured the 
rover for the winter environment. The project used the last drive opportunities to try to improve 
the northerly tilt of the rover. Unfortunately, this was unsuccessful and had little impact on the 
rover’s already unfavorable tilt, with the arrays tilting south instead of north. 
 The unfavorable tilt of the rover made it susceptible to an increased risk of a low-power fault 
during the winter and further risk of a mission clock fault if the rover’s batteries were depleted 
sufficiently. And of course, there was the risk of a complete loss of the rover from the harsh 
environment. 
 The project implemented a long-range set of DSN X-band and UHF communication passes 
to carry Spirit through the winter season. Communication windows were scheduled nine months 
into the future. The UHF passes in particular were complicated by orbit drift of the relay orbiters 
so far into the future. Spirit’s fault windows were similarly complicated by clock drift over time. 
The project also updated some onboard fault protection parameters. 
9 LOSS OF SIGNAL, PROBABLE FAULTS, AND RECOVERY 
EFFORT 
The last signal from Spirit occurred on Sol 2210 (2010-03-22). The first occurrence of loss of 
signal was on Sol 2218 (2010-03-30). Subsequent to the loss of signal, the project began the 
recovery effort for Spirit. That effort began with listening for the X-band fault windows (from 
low-power/Uploss fault) and for the autonomous UHF windows (from Uploss fault). As the 
continued lack of response suggested a possible mission clock fault, the project implemented a 
“Sweep&Beep” command strategy to elicit a response from the rover in the event the rover lost 
its knowledge of time. 
 All combinations of X-band and UHF transmit and receive hardware configurations were 
attempted as part of the recovery, along with commanding over a range of frequencies and times 
of day. Hardware (low-level) commands were attempted to exercise different boot banks within 
EEPROM. Between 2010-07-27 and 2011-07-13, 1411 commands were radiated as part of the 
recovery effort with no detection of any signal at X-band (both polarizations) or UHF (through 
the Mars orbiters). 
 The proximate cause for loss of the rover is not known, but is likely one of the following: 
(1) failure of a critical hardware element, such as the telecommunications (X-band and UHF) 
subsystem, the central computer systems or communications bus, the power subsystem (batteries, 
control board, switches), and the cabling; (2) insufficient energy from the solar arrays and 
batteries to permit rover wakeup; or (3) the complete mis-synchronization of the recovery 
commands with Mission Clock Fault.  
 The contributing causes include: (1) excessive dust on the rover solar arrays, reducing energy 
production; (2) the embedding at Troy, preventing favorable positioning of the solar arrays for 
winter; and (3) the fact that Spirit was well beyond design life with hardware that experienced 
thousands of deep thermal cycles. The ultimate root cause was likely the damaging effects of a 
very cold winter environment. 
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10 LESSONS LEARNED 
The MER Project made several changes to rover driving practices subsequent to the Spirit 
embedding at Troy. The project also implemented important changes to driving practices prior to 
Troy as a result of embedding events around the north and northeast parts of Home Plate, 
although these changes did not prevent the Troy embedding. The project now routinely produces 
Hazard Maps for drive planning in challenging or uncertain terrain. Further, the project 
established the Science Advisor role in tactical operations for mobility assessment. After Spirit’s 
embedding at Troy, the project further implemented the 90% Slip Rule, where any detected 
occurrence of greater than 90% slip requires the project manager be notified and then requires 
project manager approval to resume driving. The project also advanced the analytic tools for 
mobility assessment with the development of sophisticated terra-mechanics modeling to 
investigate mobility-terrain interactions. 
 The project also made changes to fault protection parameters (on Opportunity) to enable 
better predictability in the event of fault conditions. The UP_TOO_LONG parameter was 
lengthened to avoid rover shut-downs before fault communication windows. The project disabled 
the coaxial switch change under the UPLOSS fault. This further avoids a potential switch failure 
on Opportunity. 
 An extensive repository of project lessons learned can be found in the MER project archive, 
Docushare Collection #23581. 
11 CONCLUSION 
Spirit landed in Gusev crater on January 4, 2004, then crossed the Gusev plains, climbed the 
Columbia Hills, reached the summit of Husband Hill, and then descended to Home Plate. The 
rover survived three Martian winters and two major dust storms. Last contact from Spirit was on 
March 22, 2010. Spirit’s scientific discoveries include evidence of ancient water and carbonate 
minerals indicating neutral pH environments, the existence of ancient hydro-thermal systems, 
and probable recent (last obliquity change) water action on Mars. 
 By any measure, Spirit was a tremendous scientific and engineering success. The rover 
operated for 2210 sols and drove more than 7.7 kilometers, well beyond the original 90-sol 
duration and 1-kilometer distance requirements. The appendix contains a summary of 
accumulated rover parameters. 
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Appendix A—MER-A TRENDS (SOLS 1 – 2210) 
MER-A Actuator Use (Sols 1 – 2210)  
 
Mobility Actuator Motor Revs (M) 
Left Front Wheel 18.747 
Left Middle 
Wheel 17.450 
Left Rear Wheel 17.953 
Right Front 
Wheel 14.620 
Right Middle 
Wheel 17.755 
Right Rear Wheel 17.413 
 
Left Front 
Steering 1.182 
Left Rear 
Steering 1.248 
Right Front 
Steering 1.109 
Right Rear 
Steering 1.303 
MER-A Notes:  
Right front wheel failed on Sol 779 
Right Rear Drive failed on Sols  
2100–2101 
Mobility Actuators tested lifetime: 
10 million revs 
Projected prime mission use: 
2.5 million revs 
 
 
HGA Actuator Motor Revs (M) 
HGA Azimuth 4.083 
HGA Elevation 5.590 
 
 
PMA Actuator Motor Revs (M) 
 
 
MI Dust Cover Actuations Actuations 
MI Dust Cover 942 
Note: Each open is one actuation. Each 
close is one actuation.  
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PMA Azimuth 64.440 
PMA Camera 
Elevation 8.132 
PMA MTES Mirror 
Elevation 1.899 
 
 
 
 
 
IDD Actuator Motor Revs (M) 
IDD Shoulder 
Azimuth 1.824 
IDD Shoulder 
Elevation 2.281 
IDD Elbow 2.583 
IDD Wrist 0.570 
IDD Turret 1.397 
 
 
 
 
RAT Actuator Motor Revs (M) 
RAT Revolve 1.785 
RAT Grind 16.284 
 
RAT Actuator Distance (Meters) 
RAT Z 3.667 
Note: Encoder failures on RAT prevents accurate rev count. 
MER-A Note: RAT grinding bit worn out  
MER-A Note: RAT grind encoders failed on Sol 1341  
 
 
 
PMA Filter Wheel 
Actuator 
Motor Revs 
(K) 
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PMA Left Filter Wheel 13.171 
PMA Right Filter Wheel 11.526 
 
 
 
MER-A Drive Data (Sols 1 – 2210)  
Drive 
Parameters 
Distance 
(Meters) 
Drive Distance 7730.50 
 
 
 
MER-A 3 Longest Drives (Sols 1 – 2210)  
Distance Sol 
122.7 125 
113.1 133 
109.5 134 
 
 
 
MER-A IDD Data (Sols 1 – 2210)  
IDD Parameters Number 
IDD Sols 591 
Note: Number of IDD Sols is 
incremented each sol there is ANY 
movement in the IDD Joints  
 
MTES Use (Sols) Number 
MTES Sols 1546 
 
 
 
Drive Parameters Number 
Bumps to Position 177 
Drives for Distance 302 
Total Number of Drive Sols 479 
Note: Bumps indicate a drive with odometry 
less than 5 meters  
 
IDD Tool Use 
(Sols)S Number 
MB 462 
APXS 359 
MI 356 
RAT 101 
Note: Data in this table originates from 
EVRs  
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MER-A Switch Use (Sols 1 – 2210)  
Power Switches Channel Actuations 
Camera Power Converter P-0405 14376 
Mobility Actuators Power P-0513 7200 
IDD Actuators Power P-0515 2338 
PMA Actuators Power P-0517 58626 
 
VME Power Converters Power P-0506 0 
Motor Control Board Logic Power 
Converters Power P-0408 11058 
IMU Power Converters Power P-0482 2992 
MB Power P-0412 952 
APXS Power P-0413 730 
RAT Power P-0516 402 
MTES Power P-0454 8266 
SDST Power P-0467 656 
SSPA A Power P-0507 3355 
SSPA B Power P-0511 0 
UHF Power P-0512 5193 
HGA Actuators Power P-0518 2230 
 
MI Heater Power P-0401 20 
RAT Heater Power P-0464 2 
MTES Heater A Power P-0503 7 
MTES Heater B Power P-0487 7 
REM Survival Heater A1 Power P-0406 79 
REM Survival Heater B1 Power P-0402 79 
REM Survival Heater A2 Power P-0474 79 
REM Survival Heater B2 Power P-0466 79 
Front HazCam Heaters Power P-0468 38 
Rear HazCam Heaters Power P-0470 4 
NavCam Heaters Power P-0472 268 
PanCam Warmup Heaters Power P-0476 550 
HGA Bearing Heaters Power P-0489 476 
HGA Actuators Heaters Power P-0490 478 
PanCam Bearing Heaters Power P-0491 382 
MCB FPGA Heater Power P-0455 0 
Left Wheel Heaters Power P-0481 672 
Right Wheel Heaters Power P-0485 644 
Note: Each open is one actuation. Each close is one actuation.  
Note: UHF radio is the same model as ODY. ODY uses 10k cycles (20k actuations) as lifetime.  
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Telecom Switch 
Actuations Channel Actuations 
WTS T-0200 4313 
Coax 0 T-0201 0 
Coax 1 T-0202 43 
Coax 2 T-0203 2 
Note: Each open is one actuation. Each close is one actuation.  
Note: Waveguide switch and Coax switches rated at 10k cycles (20k actuations).  
 
 
MER-A Data Return (Sols 1 – 2210)  
 
 
 
Data Return GB % 
MGS 0.35 1.6 
ODY 20.72 96.1 
MRO 0.12 0.5 
DTE 0.37 1.7 
MEX 0.01 0.1 
TOTAL DATA 
RETURN 21.57 	  
 
 
 
 
Average Data Return Mb 
Avg per Sol 79.96 
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MER-A Data Type (By APID) (Sols 1 – 2210)  
Type Volume (MB) % 
Real Time EHA 85.70 0.4 
Real Time Info EVRs 2.39 0.0 
Real Time Activity EVRs 7.83 0.0 
Real Time Command EVRs 1.70 0.0 
Real Time Warning EVRs 1.28 0.0 
Left Pancam 5541.60 25.2 
Right Pancam 4111.62 18.7 
Left Navcam 2487.36 11.3 
Right Navcam 1700.24 7.7 
Left Front Hazcam 521.16 2.4 
Right Front Hazcam 553.91 2.5 
Left Rear Hazcam 280.28 1.3 
Right Rear Hazcam 274.14 1.2 
MI 1964.12 8.9 
DI 1.31 0.0 
MiniTES 2099.74 9.5 
APXS 14.48 0.1 
MB 111.12 0.5 
RAT 32.80 0.1 
IDD 62.37 0.3 
Recorded EHA 422.81 1.9 
Recorded Activity EVRs 67.51 0.3 
Recorded Command EVRs 70.15 0.3 
Recorded Warning EVRs 12.25 0.1 
Recorded Fault EVRs 0.05 0.0 
Comm Engineering 60.12 0.3 
HGA and PMA 323.88 1.5 
EDL Recorded 2.49 0.0 
FSW Engineering 642.80 2.9 
ACS Engineering 0.04 0.0 
Motor Control 30.65 0.1 
Mobility Engineering 517.79 2.4 
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MER-A Data Return Summary (Sols 1 – 2210)  
Type Volume (GB) % 
Engineering Channelized 0.50 2.3 
Engineering EVRs 0.16 0.7 
Engineering Images 5.68 26.4 
Engineering DPs 1.60 7.5 
Science Images 11.35 52.8 
Science DPs 2.21 10.3 
Total Data Returned 21.57 100 
MER-A Warning EVR Summary (Sols 1 – 2210)  
Warning EVR Type Total Count 
Single Event Upsets 23 
Remote Engineering Unit Invalid 
Response 38 
Acquisition Error Warnings 21 
Write Verification Error 0 
Interface Electronics to Stepper Motor 10 
MER-A Misc Data (Sols 1 – 2210)  
Radiation 
Source Type 
Strength At 
Landing Current Strength 
% 
Remaining 
Mossbauer 
Source Cobalt 57 (gamma ray) 150 mCi 0.46 mCi 0.3 
APXS Source Curium 244 (alpha particle & X-ray) 30 mCi 23.64 mCi 78.8 
RHU Source* Plutonium 238 (alpha particle) 33.6 Ci / 1 Watt 
31.99 Ci/ 0.95 
Watts 95.2 
*RHU Strength was 1 Watt at delivery, not 1 Watt at landing. 
MER-A Summary of Image Source Totals, Sol 1 to Sol 2210 
Source Images Total Counts 
EDL Images 3 
Front Hazcam Images 7,432 
Rear Hazcam Images 3,351 
MI Images 6,053 
Navcam Images 27,432 
Pancam Images 80,568 
TOTAL NUMBER OF MER-A IMAGES 124,839 
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Appendix B—ACRONYM LIST 
AEGIS Autonomous Exploration for 
Gathering Increased Science 
APAM Activity Plan Approval Meeting 
APXS Alpha Particle X-ray 
Spectrometer 
DSN Deep Space Network 
EDR Experimental Data Record 
ECAM Engineering Camera 
ERT Earth Receive Time 
FSW Flight Software 
GDS Ground Data System 
Hazcam Hazard Avoidance Camera 
HGA High-gain Antenna 
IDD Instrument Deployment Device 
IST Integrated Sequence Team 
IVP Inertial Vector Propagator 
JPL Jet Propulsion Laboratory 
KOP Keeper of the Plan 
LGA Low-gain Antenna 
MB Moessbauer Spectrometer 
MCT Mission Control Team 
MDOT Mission Data Operations Team 
MER Mars Exploration Rover 
MI Microscopic Imager 
MIPL Multi-mission Image Process Lab 
(Team) 
MM Mission Manager 
Mini-TES Miniature Thermal Emission 
Spectrometer 
MRO Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter 
MSL Mars Science Laboratory 
NAIF Navigation and Ancillary 
Information Facility 
NASA National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration 
Navcam Navigation Camera 
ODY Mars Odyssey 
OSS Operations Storage Server 
Pancam Panoramic Camera 
PDL Payload Downlink Lead 
PDS Planetary Data System 
PMA Pancam Mast Assembly 
PUL Payload Uplink Lead 
RAT Rock Abrasion Tool 
RDR Reduced Data Record 
REM Rover Electronics Module 
SOST Science Operations Support Team 
SOWG Science Operations Working 
Group 
SRET Spacecraft/Rover Engineering 
Team 
SSTB Surface System Testbed 
TAP/SIE Tactical Activity 
Planner/Sequence Integration 
Engineer 
TDL Tactical Downlink Lead 
TUL Tactical Uplink Lead 
UHF Ultra High Frequency 
UTC Universal Time Coordinated 
WEB Warm Electronics Box 
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